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  The aim of this study is to determine the influence of a linguistic form of conditional 
sentences and the polarity of mayor premises on subject´s ability to reason about 
conditional rules and their confidence in the selection of correct responses. 
  The conditional connective “if…then” expresses one of the elementary relation between 
antecedent and consequent propositions. According to the standard logic, a conditional 
of the form “if p … then q” is equivalent to “whenever p …  then q”. But the “whenever 
… then” colloquial expressions stresses the  deterministic relationship between p and 
q terms, and the “if…then” colloquial expressions stresses another probabilistic 
relationship between antecedent and consequent. 
  The objective of the experiment is to test that conditional reasoning in the abstract 
content problems varies as a function of the degree of relationship between antecedent 
and  consequent of conditional sentences and their polarity. 
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  In contrast the syntactic theory, we considered that performance shall generally be 
better in the "whenever...then" than the "if...then" rules. In addition, we also expected 
unbetter confidence for the "whenever...then" linguistic form. 
 





  Eighty-eight subjects participated in this experiment (50 females and 38 males). Forty-
four subjects were allocated at random to each of the two experimental groups. All 
subjects were students at the college level (mean age 18 years 7 months), at Santiago 
de Compostela (Spain). 





  A 2 x 4 x 4 factorial design with repatead measures on the last two factors was 
used. The three factors were: linguistic form of conditional sentence ("if…then”, 
“whenever…then”), type of conditional rules: Modus Ponens (MP),  Modus Tollens 
(MT), Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent (NA) and the 
polarity, with the four possible combinations of affirmative and negative components 
(AA, AN, NA NN). 
  The dependent measures were: a) correct answer to conditional problems and b) 







  Four versions of the 32 item conditional reasoning test  were constructed by the 
experimenters. These items represented all the possib1e variations of a basic two-
premises conditional arguments according to the type of rule (MP, MT, AC and DA)  and 
the polarity of the components of major premises (AA, AN, NA, NN).  
  The presentation of the 32 items was randomized and the reasoning problems were 
presented in this order and in the reverse order ( IA-1 vs. A-2; IB-1 vs. IB-2). 
 
Task and Procedure 
 
    Subjects were assigned at random to one of the two linguistic forms of the conditional  
sentences. There were 44 subjects in each condition and they were tested in two 
experimental sessions. 
    Within each of these two main groups were given the problems in a randomized order 
and half of subjects were set the items in  reverse order. All subjects were given  one 
version of the test booklets. 
    Subjects received written instructions. The subject 's task  was assume that the two premises 
of each conditional argument are true and, on the basis of this knowledge, to select of a list of 
three alternatives the conclusion followed from the premises. 
    A second task was to rate the subjective security in the se selection of response for 
each problem. A five-point scale was  used, where 5 meant the maximum score and 1 meant 
the minimum security in the subject's selection responses. 
  These instructions were read to the subjects and they were asked for reading them again 
to themselves. Prior to the test problems there were two practice items using conditional 
inferences. Questions were solicited from the subject to they ensure that they 
understood the instructions. 







  There was a significant main effect for the type of rule (F (3,258) = 70.56; p < .0001) 
and a significant interactive effect between type of rule x polarity (F (9, 774) = 5,14; p 
< .0001 ). There was no main effect  involving the linguistic form of conditional sentences; 
however,  the interaction between type of rule x polarity x linguistic form was significant 
(F (9, 774) = 2.56; p < .0067). 
For  abstract conditional arguments, the mean percentage of correct responses for  
MP, MT, AC and NA rules were 85.57 %, 57.25%, 25.6%, 26.99%, respectively. 
There were no significant differences for problems involving AC and DA rules, but 
post hoc comparisons  (Tukey's test)  showed that AC and DA arguments were significantly 
(p< .05) more difficult than the corresponding MT and MP. On the  other hand, MP 
arguments were consistently (p< .05) earlier than MT arguments. 
  The comparisons (Tukey's test)  of the mean within each type of rule indicated that 
arguments with AN major premises were  significantly (p < .05) easier for MT rules. On 
the other hand, there were significantly less (p< .05) incorrect inferences DA when the 
subjects reasoned with conditional arguments having major premises with two negative 
components (NN). For AC rules,  arguments involving a major premises with AA polarity 
were, in fact, significantly (p< .05) easier than those involving the denial of a 
component of the major premise. 
  Finally when they reasoned with "if ... then" conditional sentences and MP rules, 
arguments involving AA major premises were signifícantly (p< .05) more difficult than 
those with AN and  NA  polarity. But  with "whenever ... then" conditional sentences  
and MP rules, these arguments (AA) were easier (p< .05) than  those involving 
AN or NA polarity. 
  A final issue involves an examination of the effects of the  three manipulated factors on 
subjective confidence in the correct subject's reasoning performance. A 2 x 4 x 4 
(linguistic form x  type of rule x polarity) factorial design, with repeated measures on the last 
 
 
two factors was used. There was also significant main effects for type of rule F (3,258) = 
72.73; p < .001). Tukey's comparisons (p < .05) revealed better security for the MP 
problems than those MT, AC and DA. Moreover, the confidence that a subject has about 
his logical performance was significantly greater (p < .05) for AC and DA problems than 
those MT rules. 
  There was also a significant type of rule x linguistic form interaction (F (3,258) = 3.52; p<. 
0156). The comparisons  (Tukey's test) of the means for “if…then” arguments and 
"whenever...then" conditionals for each type of rule,    showed that  MP, MT and AC 
rules with "if...then" sentences were significantly (p< .05) easier than the corresponding 





    The aim of this experiment is to explore the importance of: a) type of thematic content 
and b) factual relationship between the p and q terms of conditional sentence, on the subject´s 
performance and on the subject's correct response confidence. 
    The experiment 1 failed to show any significant difference  between t he performance on 
the “if p then q” and “whenever p then q” conditional rules. In this experiment, the materials 
were composed of thematic elements in a coherent relationship between antecedent and 
consequent of major premise. It is possible to hypothesize that such cases should produce 
facilitation performance. 
  To assess this hypothesis, in experiment 2 the degree of factual relationship between the 
two components of major premises was  man ipulated. 
  We also assessed the effects of different thematic content. If people reason using syntactic 
rules neither type of content should be more effective in itself. In contrast, if people reason 
using pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989; Cheng, Holyoak, 
Nisbett & Oliver, 1986) performance on the causal and promises/threats problems should be 







  The subjects were ninety-six students (47 males and 49 females) at the college level 
(mean age 18 years, 5 months) at Santiago of Compostela (Spain). 
  They all participated as unpaid volunteers in this study. None of these subjects have 





  A 3 x 4 x 3 (type of content x type of conditional rule x probability of factual relation 
between antecedent and consequent) factorial design was used. The type of content 
factor had three levels: Causal content, Temporal and Promises/Threats content. This 
factor was manipulated between subjects, with 48 participants randomly assigned to each 
experimental groups. 
  The repatead measures on the last two factors was used. The second factor (type of 
conditional rule) was similar to the experiment 1. Finally, the last factor (degree of factual 
relation between antecedent and consequent of major premise) had three levels: Deterministic, 





  Six variations of the 24 conditional reasoning test were  used. Test booklets were 
constructed each containing an instruction page and the conditional reasoning problems 
presented on separate pages. 
  There were 24 conditional arguments for each of three different contexts: a) 
Causal (IIA-1, IIA-2; vg.“If you fall to the water then you will get wet yourself”, 
b) Temporal (IIB-1, IIB-2; vg.“if today is monday then yesterday was sunday” 
 
 
and c) Promises/Threats (IIC-1, IIC-2; vg.“If you have the snack then I take you 
for a walk”).  
  As in experiment 1, each booklet was prepared containing conditional arguments 
according to the type of logical rule (MP, MT, AC and DA). Finally, the 
conditional sentences differed according to the probability of factual relationship 
between antecedent and consequent of major premise: a) Deterministic (vg. “if 
you put your hand into fire then you will burnt yourself”), b) Probabilistic (vg. “if 
you study then you pass”) and c) Without Relation (vg. “if you are ugly then you 
are pleasant”). 
  These sentences were based on previous experimental work. 100 undergraduate 
Psychology students from the University of Santiago de Compostela were required to 
write 20 conditional sentences with causal content, 20 conditional sentences with  
temporal content and another 20 with promises/threats. A further 100 similar subjects 
took part in a posterior study. The subject´s task was to rate the probability of factual 
relation between antecedent and consequent of these conditional sentences. Finally, 
the conditionals with a maximum degree of agreement between the subjects were 
selected by the experimenters for the reasoning problems test of experiment 2. 
  The order of presentation of the items within each booklet was randomized as those 
of experiment 1. 
 
Task and procedure 
 
   In general, the procedure was the same as that used in the previous experiment. The 
study was run in three experimental sessions. Thirty-three subjects were allocated at 
random to each of the three experimental groups (causal content, temporal content or 
promises/threats) in the conditional test problems. 
  As in experiment 1, subjects were required to select a conclusion which necessarily 
followed from the premises for each  conditional argument and to rate the security in their 
selection of response. A five-point scale was used.  






  An ana1ysis of variance of the correctness of subject 's answer for each of the test item 
indicated that there were  significant main effects for: type of rule (F (3,275 = 38.28); 
p< .0001), the type of content (F (2, 186) = 4.92; p<. 0093) and probability of factual 
relationship between antecedent and consequent of the major premise (F(2, 186) = 
9.3; p< .0001). 
  For thematic conditional arguments, the mean percentages of correct responses for MP, 
MT, AC and DA rules were 83.30 %, 60.57 %, 44.97 %  and 36.76%, respectively. The  
comparisons (Tukey´s test)  for each type of rule showed that MP conditional arguments 
were significantly (p< .05) easier than the corresponding MT, AC and DA arguments. On 
the other hand, MT conditional arguments were consistently easier (p< .05) than AC and DA 
problems and, finally, AC items were easier (p< .05) than those of DA conditional 
problems. 
  Test of the simple main effects showed that subject´s performance with causal 
content was significantly (p< .05) better than the temporal and promises/threats 
contents. There were no significant differences for problems involving temporal 
content or promises/threats included in the premises. 
  Tukey´s test comparison for the factual relation between antecedent and consequent 
of conditional sentence (p< .05) demonstrated that the subjects performed better when  
they reasoned with deterministic relations between the two components of the major 
premise. 
  There were also a significant interactive effect between factual relation x type of 
content (F (4, 186) = 2.80; p< .0273 and between factual relation x type of rule (F (6, 
558) = 13.79; p< .0001. Tukey´s comparisons (p < .05) indicated significantly better 
performance on the deterministic relation than on either of the other two types of 
relations, with causal content and promises/threats in the premises. But, with temporal 
content, the probabilistic relation between antecedent and consequent showed the 
 
 
greatest performance (p < .05). 
  On the other hand, inspection of paired comparisons for the factual relation x type of 
rule revealed that subjects make more correct responses with the MP, MT, AC rules 
in the deterministic relation (p< .05). But also indicated that judging concerning DA 
inferences are often more correct with probabilistic factual relation between the two 
components of major premise (p< .05). 
  As in experiment 1, subjective security was examined. As in earlier experiment there 
was a significant main effects for the type of rule (F (3, 279) = 14.90; p<  .0001). 
Tukey´s comparisons (p< .05) for the main effect of the type of rule (F( 3, 279) = 
14.90; p< .0001). Tukey´s comparisons (p< .05) for the main effect of type of rule 
also showed greater security on the MP problems than on the other three rules (p< 
.05). No other comparisons were significant. 
  Lastly, there were significant main effects for probability of factual relation (F ( 2, 186) = 
10.29; p < .0001) and a significant interaction between factual relation x type of content (F 
(4, 186) = 3.72; p < .0062). Tukey's comparisons (p < .05) for  factual relation showed 
significant differences in the deterministic condition and the other two relationships. 
Inspection of paired comparisons for the factual relation x type of content interaction 
showed that with temporal content the subjects rate more the security in the selection of 
response in  the probabilistic relationship condition. Nevertheless, the deterministic  relation 
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